When Is a Court  Punishing  Out-of-State Conduct Rather Than Merely  Considering  Such Conduct? by Van Cleave, Rachel A.
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Publications Faculty Scholarship
2003
When Is a Court "Punishing" Out-of-State
Conduct Rather Than Merely "Considering" Such
Conduct?
Rachel A. Van Cleave
Golden Gate University School of Law, rvancleave@ggu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Publications by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
2002-2003 Preview U.S. Sup. Ct. Cas. 124 (2002-2003).
PUNITIVE DAMAGE S
When Is a Court "Punishing"
Out-of-State Conduct Rather Than Merely
"Considering" Such Conduct?
by Rachel A. Van Cleave
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 124-130. © 2002 American Bar Association.
Rachel A. Van Cleave is a professor
of law at Texas Tech University
School of Law and is completing an
article entitled "Death is
Different"-Is Money Different?
Criminal Punishments, Forfeitures,
and Punitive Damages: Shifting
Paradigms for Assessing
Proportionality";
Rachel.VanCleave@law.ttu.edu or
(806) 742-3990, ext. 271.
ISSUES
Did the Utah Supreme Court incor-
rectly interpret and apply BMW of
North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559 (1996), when it relied, in
part, on the defendant's out-of-state
conduct to bolster its decision to
reinstate a punitive damages award
of $145 million?
Is a punitive damages award that is
145 times greater than the award of
compensatory damages "grossly
excessive" in violation of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment?
FACTS
This case has its roots in an auto-
mobile accident that occurred on
May 22, 1981, more than 20 years
ago. Curtis Campbell unsafely
passed a car driven by Robert
Slusher, forcing another car, driven
by Todd Ospital, to veer onto the
shoulder of the road and collide
with Slusher's car. Ospital died at
the scene and Slusher was left dis-
abled. Campbell was insured by
State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company, and his policy
provided $25,000 of coverage for
each person injured in an accident,
up to a maximum of $50,000 of cov-
erage per accident.
Slusher sued both Campbell and
Ospital's estate. Ospital then assert-
ed a cross-claim against Campbell.
Slusher entered into a settlement
agreement with Ospital's estate. The
attorneys for Slusher and for
Ospital's estate offered to settle
their claims against Campbell with
State Farm for the policy limits.
State Farm, however, refused to set-
tle and continued to reject settle-
ment offers made until the lawsuit
by Slusher and Ospital began. The
facts as described by the Utah
Supreme Court indicate that one of
State Farm's investigators had sub-
mitted a report stating that there
was evidence that Campbell was at
fault. State Farm rejected this
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report and ordered its investigator
to change his description of the
accident and his conclusion that the
claims against Campbell were
strong. Campbell v. State Farm
Automobile Insurance Co., 2001 UT
89, P5.
State Farm hired an attorney,
Wendell Bennett, who had done
work for State Farm in the past, to
represent the Campbells. Bennett
reassured both Campbell and his
wife, Inez Campbell, on numerous
occasions that they did not need to
seek separate counsel, that he
would represent their interests, and
that their assets were safe. The case
against Campbell then went to trial
and the jury, finding Campbell 100
percent at fault for the accident,
awarded Slusher $135,000 and
Ospital's estate $50,849. These
awards exceeded Campbell's policy
limit of $50,000. After the verdict,
State Farm refused to post a bond,
pending appeal, in excess of the pol-
icy limit, and Bennett suggested to
the Campbells that they put "for
sale" signs on their property, mak-
ing it clear that State Farm would
not pay the excess judgment against
the Campbells.
The Campbells then retained other
counsel and entered into an agree-
ment with Slusher and Ospital that
provided, in part, that Slusher and
Ospital would not seek satisfaction
on their judgment against the
Campbells. In exchange, the
Campbells would pursue a bad faith
action against State Farm and pay a
portion of any money recovered
from State Farm to Slusher and to
Ospital's estate. After the Utah
Supreme Court affirmed the judg-
ment against Campbell in Slusher v.
Ospital, 777 P.2d 437 (Utah 1989),
State Farm paid the entire award to
Slusher and Ospital.
Shortly after State Farm paid the
judgments against Campbell, the
Campbells filed this action against
State Farm alleging bad faith, fraud,
intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and a claim for punitive
damages.
At the request of State Farm, the
trial court "bifurcated" the trial into
two phases. In phase one, the jury
determined that State Farm had act-
ed unreasonably and in bad faith
when it failed to settle the claims
against Campbell because there was
a substantial likelihood that a ver-
dict against him would exceed his
policy limits. At the conclusion of
phase two, the jury awarded the
Campbells $2.6 million in compen-
satory damages and $145 million in
punitive damages. The trial court
ordered a remittitur of the awards
to $1 million in compensatory dam-
ages and $25 million in punitive
damages. The trial court stated that
it remitted the punitive damages
award because it believed that state
precedent placed a legal limit on the
ratio of punitive damages to com-
pensatory damages. On appeal, the
Utah Supreme Court reinstated the
$145 million punitive damages
award against State Farm after
reviewing the issue of excessiveness
under a de novo standard pursuant
to Cooper Industries, Inc. v.
Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S.
424 (2001). A de novo standard of
review does not require the review-
ing court to accord any deference to
the conclusion of the lower court.
State Farm petitioned the Supreme
Court for review, and the Court
granted certiorari on June 3, 2002.
CASE ANALYSIS
Jurisprudence from the United
States Supreme Court concerning
the constitutional review of punitive
damages awards is relatively young.
After rejecting invitations to review
punitive damages awards for exces-
siveness under the excessive fines
clause of the Eighth Amendment in
Browning-Ferris Industries of
Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989), the Court
hinted that perhaps the due process
clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment places outer limits on
the size of punitive damages awards.
However, the Court did not evaluate
the $6 million punitive damages
award in Browning-Ferris because
the petitioner failed to raise the due
process argument in the lower
courts.
T\vo years later, in Pacific Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499
U.S. 1 (1991), the Court evaluated
the procedural safeguards used by
the state court to guard against
unfettered jury discretion that could
lead to a punitive damages award
violative of due process. Once the
Court determined that the proce-
dural protections were constitution-
ally sound, it briefly considered the
size of the punitive damages award.
Haslip's fraud action was based on
the fact that an agent of Pacific
Mutual had embezzled insurance
premiums rather than remitting
them to Pacific Mutual. As a result,
Pacific Mutual cancelled Haslip's
insurance and her credit was
adversely affected. The trial court
found that the punitive damages
award was appropriate because the
conduct involved "evidenced inten-
tional malicious, gross, or oppres-
sive fraud" and that it was neces-
sary to deter similar conduct by
insurers. Id. at 23. The Supreme
Court pointed to these findings and
noted that the $840,000 punitive
damages award was four times the
compensatory damages and thus
"close to the line" but held that
such an award did not "cross the
line into the area of constitutional
impropriety." Id. at 23-24. Thus, the
court acknowledged that there is a
constitutional line over which puni-
tive damages awards may not cross.
(Continued on Page 126)
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In 1993 the Court addressed anoth-
er fraud claim in TXO Production
Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,
509 U.S. 443, 458 (1993), and
expressly stated what it had implied
in Haslip: the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
hibits a state from imposing "grossly
excessive" punishment on a tortfea-
sor. TXO had brought a frivolous
declaratory judgment action regard-
ing the title of certain property in
an attempt to defraud Alliance
Resources. However, the Court
upheld the punitive damages award
of $10 million, which was more
than 526 times the actual damages
awarded. In addition to considering
the ratio of the punitive damages
award to the actual damages, the
Court determined that "the amount
of money potentially at stake, the
bad faith of [TXO], the fact that the
scheme employed in this case was
part of a larger pattern of fraud,
trickery and deceit, and [TXOJ's
wealth" supported a conclusion that
the punitive damages award was not
"grossly excessive." Id. at 462.
Most recently, and for the first time,
the Supreme Court struck a punitive
damages award as "grossly exces-
sive." BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). In that
case, BMW failed to disclose to Dr.
Gore that it had repainted the car he
purchased. The parties presumed
that the car had been damaged while
being transported between the man-
ufacturing plant and the preparation
center. Gore sued BMW for fraud
based on BMW's suppression of a
material fact. The jury awarded him
$4,000 in compensatory damages,
apparently based on evidence that
the repainted car was worth 10 per-
cent less than the value of a new car
that had not been damaged or
repainted. Gore argued that BMW
had failed to disclose such informa-
tion in about 1,000 other instances
and that the jury should multiply
this number by the $4,000 reduction
in value to arrive at a punitive dam-
ages award of $4 million. The jury
awarded Gore $4 million in punitive
damages.
The Alabama Supreme Court ruled
that the jury improperly included
similar sales in other states in its
calculation of punitive damages and
ordered a remittitur to $2 million.
The United States Supreme Court
determined that even this reduced
punitive damages award was grossly
excessive. In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Court stated that due
process requires that a person
receive fair notice of the severity of
any penalty a state might impose.
To evaluate the constitutionality of
a particular punitive damages
award, the Court considered three
guideposts: "the reprehensibility of
the nondisclosure; the disparity
between the harm or potential harm
suffered by Dr. Gore and his puni-
tive damages award; and the differ-
ence between this remedy and the
civil penalties authorized or
imposed in comparable cases." 517
U.S. at 575. The Court determined
that, compared to the behavior of
the defendants in TXO and Haslip,
BMW's failure to disclose was less
reprehensible than the "deliberate
false statements and acts of affirma-
tive misconduct" present in TXO
and Haslip, especially where BMW
believed, in good faith, that there
was no duty to disclose such infor-
mation. Id. at 579-80. In addition,
the Court pointed out that the harm
Gore suffered was "purely econom-
ic," having no effect on the safety of
the car. Id. at 576.
As to the ratio, or proportionality, of
the punitive damages award to the
actual harm suffered by Gore, the
Court held that 500 to 1 was "dra-
matically greater than [the ratios]
considered in TXO and Haslip,"
especially in the absence of any
threat of additional harm. Id. at 582.
The third guidepost engages the
Court in a comparative analysis,
examining possible statutory sanc-
tions for the same conduct in the
jurisdiction in question as well as in
other jurisdictions. In BMW, the
Court pointed out that in Alabama,
the maximum fine authorized under
Alabama law for a violation of the
Deceptive Trade Practices Act is
$2,000. Civil penalties in other
jurisdictions range from $50 for a
first offense to $250 for subsequent
violations. The most severe penal-
ties range from $5,000 to $10,000.
Thus, the $2 million punitive dam-
ages award was "substantially
greater than the statutory fines
available in Alabama and else-
where." Id. at 584. The Court
acknowledged the state's interest in
"punishing unlawful conduct and
deterring its repetition" but con-
cluded that BMW's conduct was not
sufficiently egregious to justify such
a large punitive damages award. Id.
at 568 and 585. In the present case,
State Farm v. Campbell, the Court
is asked to strike another punitive
damages award as grossly excessive.
Overall, State Farm argues that the
Utah courts punished State Farm for
alleged misconduct that occurred
outside the borders of the state of
Utah and thus that the punitive
damages award went well beyond
Utah's interest in punishing and
deterring misconduct in Utah and
protecting Utah citizens. Thus,
claims State Farm, the breadth of
evidence considered by the Utah
courts tainted their consideration of
each of the guideposts set out in
BMW.
In evaluating the first guidepost
regarding the reprehensibility of
State Farm's conduct, the Utah
Supreme Court relied on detailed
findings made by the trial court
showing that State Farm had
engaged in a pattern of "trickery
and deceit," "false statements," and
Issue No. 3
other "acts of affirmative miscon-
duct" targeted at "financially vul-
nerable" persons. 2001 UT 89, P32.
The trial court's findings were
based, in part, on State Farm's
"Performance, Planning and
Review," or PP&R policy, which had
been in effect for more than 20
years and applied to State Farm
employees nationwide.
On review, the Utah Supreme Court
did not set out all of the findings
regarding the reprehensibility of
State Farm's conduct but pointed to
a few representing State Farm's
''most egregious and malicious
behavior." Id. at P28. These includ-
ed that State Farm, for over two
decades, encouraged adjusters to
pay less than the market value for
claims and rewarded those adjusters
who were successful. Agents
changed contents of files, lied to
customers, and committed other dis-
honest and fraudulent acts. In the
underlying lawsuit against Campbell,
a State Farm official instructed the
adjuster to change the report of the
accident to include a statement that
Ospital was "speeding to visit his
pregnant girlfriend." The Utah
Supreme Court stated that there was
no evidence to support either fact
asserted in this statement.
State Farm's witnesses admitted
that documents were routinely
destroyed to avoid potential disclo-
sure through discovery. In addition,
there was evidence that State Farm
instructs its attorneys and claims
superintendents to employ "mad
dog defense tactics" designed to
wear out opposing attorneys by
using the company's resources to
prolong litigation, make meritless
objections, claim false privileges,
and destroy documents. The Utah
Supreme Court concluded that the
pattern of State Farm's fraudulent
practices supported a high punitive
damages award.
Before the United States Supreme
Court, State Farm argues that both
the trial court and the Utah
Supreme Court improperly relied on
nationwide conduct by State
Farm-conduct that did not occur
in Utah and thus did not affect Utah
citizens. State Farm also argues that
some of the misconduct relied on by
the Utah courts was not at all simi-
lar to the alleged misconduct in the
Campbell case. Certainly, the
admissibility of evidence of "other
acts" of a defendant is purely a mat-
ter of state law. However, the ques-
tion raised in this case is whether
such evidence can support a finding
of especially reprehensible conduct
to justify such a large punitive dam-
ages award, consistent with the due
process requirements of the
Constitution.
In BMW, the Court concluded that
the state court correctly decided
that it was error for the jury to use
a multiplier that included similar
car sales in other states when calcu-
lating punitive damages. The Court
went on to state that evidence of
out-of-state transactions may,
nonetheless, "be relevant to the
determination of the degree of rep-
rehensibility of the defendant's con-
duct." It is not clear exactly what
the difference is between these two
uses of a defendant's out-of-state
conduct. BMW, 517 U.S. at 574,
n.20. In TXO, the Court stated that
reliance on evidence of "wrongdoing
in other parts of the country" may
be considered in assessing punitive
damages. TXO, 509 U.S. at 462,
n.28. The Supreme Court approved
such a factor in Haslip as well.
State Farm argues that the Utah
Supreme Court did more than rely
on out-of-state conduct to assess the
issue of reprehensibility; the state
court's decision indicates that it
actually sought to punish State
Farm for nationwide conduct over a
20-year period that included con-
duct dissimilar to that which affect-
ed the Campbells, and some of
which was lawful in other states.
Specifically, State Farm points out
that the decision to take the
Campbells' case to trial, rather than
settle, involved a third-party claim.
Yet, the Utah courts considered evi-
dence of State Farm's conduct with
respect to first-party claims, which
are quite different. Additionally,
State Farm points to reliance on evi-
dence of destruction of documents
and discrimination by State Farm
when neither of these were relevant
to the Campbells' case. State Farm
also argues that the Utah courts cast
too wide a net when considering the
effect of State Farm's conduct on
others. The Utah Supreme Court
considered the effect of the fraudu-
lent practices on other customers,
State Farm employees, and the
insurance industry generally.
By contrast, the Campbells argue
that much of the out-of-state con-
duct evidence was presented to
rebut State Farm's argument in
phase two of the trial that its failure
to settle the case against Campbell
was an "honest mistake" or an "iso-
lated lapse in judgment." Thus, evi-
dence of fraudulent conduct in oth-
er states was admitted to show that
this was not the case. Furthermore,
such out-of-state conduct evidence
showed repeated instances of fraud
and other misconduct to support a
determination that State Farm's
conduct was so reprehensible as to
require "strong medicine" in the
form of a large punitive damages
award. BMW, 517 U.S. at 577. The
Campbells also argue that many of
the types of out-of-state fraud and
misconduct were present in the
Campbells' case as well and thus
not wholly irrelevant to the issue of
reprehensibility.
As to the second guidepost regard-
ing ratio, State Farm argues that the
(Continued on Page 128)
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145 to 1 ratio of punitive to com-
pensatory damages is an example of
punitive damages "run wild." The
Utah Supreme Court acknowledged
that the punitive damages award
against State Farm is "without
precedent in Utah" but pointed out
that there is no "mathematical for-
mula" for evaluating the appropriate
ratio. 2001 UT at P19, P54. In BMW,
the Supreme Court held that due
process requires a "reasonable rela-
tionship" between punitive and
compensatory damages, but that
there is no ratio above which all
others are constitutionally dispro-
portionate. BMW, 517 U.S. at 580.
In Haslip, the Court upheld a ratio
of 4 to 1, and in TXO a ratio of 526
to 1, or not more than 10 to 1 when
potential harm was factored in with
actual damages. In BMW, however,
the Court struck an award with a
"breathtaking 500 to 1 [ratio]." The
Court found such a ratio dispropor-
tionate given the fact that neither
Gore nor other purchasers of BMWs
were threatened with additional
potential harm, as well as the fact
that the Court found that BMW's
conduct was not sufficiently repre-
hensible to support such a large
punitive damages award. Thus, it
seems that if the defendant's con-
duct was not very reprehensible, the
ratio should be smaller, but if the
conduct was very reprehensible,
this could support a higher ratio.
State Farm argues that the Utah
courts incorrectly considered State
Farm's relative wealth. The Utah
courts determined that the award of
$145 million in punitive damages
represented only 0.26 of 1 percent
of State Farm's wealth, and that a
large punitive damages award was
necessary to deter future miscon-
duct by the company. The Supreme
Court has approved consideration of
a defendant's wealth when evaluat-
ing punitive damages awards. TXO,
509 U.S. at 462, n.28; Haslip, 499
U.S. at 22. In addition, State Farm
contends in an argument similar to
its argument regarding reprehensi-
bility, it was improper for the state
courts to consider of out-of-state
and dissimilar conduct. Instead, the
state courts should have considered
only the nature of the specific claim
against State Farm by the Campbells
-an unreasonable and bad faith
failure to settle the claims against
Mr. Campbell.
The Campbells claim that the con-
duct by State Farm was sufficiently
reprehensible to support a high
ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages. In addition, they argue
that the conduct involved here is
more like that at issue in TXO,
which involved a "larger pattern of
fraud, trickery and deceit," TXO,
509 U.S. at 462, and not a single,
isolated instance of misconduct.
The Campbells also point to the
state court's finding that it is likely
that State Farm would be punished
only once in 50,000 cases. State
Farm did not dispute this figure
before the state courts. Thus, the
likelihood that State Farm is able to
evade such liability so often is said
to justify a large punitive damages
award.
Finally, State Farm argues that the
state courts incorrectly applied the
third BMW guidepost, which com-
pares the punitive damages award to
possible civil or criminal penalties
for similar misconduct. State Farm
claims that the state courts should
have compared the $145 million
punitive damages award to the
penalties for the specific miscon-
duct found by the jury in phase one
of the trial against State Farm-that
State Farm had acted unreasonably
and in bad faith in failing to settle
the claims against Mr. Campbell.
Instead, the Utah courts compared
the large punitive damages award to
penalties under the state RICO
statute and to criminal penalties.
State Farm argues that this compar-
ison was inappropriate since its con-
duct did not come within any sub-
stantive criminal offense. In addi-
tion, State Farm argues that
Supreme Court precedent requires a
comparison to "civil penalties
authorized or imposed in compara-
ble cases." BMW, 517 U.S. at 575.
State Farm claims that it would be
subject to a fine of at most $10,000
under the Utah Unfair Claims
Practices Act for a single instance of
conduct comparable to that involv-
ing the Campbells.
By contrast, the Campbells claim
that the evidence of fraud could
support much more severe civil and
criminal penalties, and further, that
the Utah courts properly considered
the maximum penalties that could
be imposed, not simply those that
have been imposed. Once again, the
arguments about this issue involve
the extent to which a court may
allow consideration of conduct oth-
er than that for which a jury found
liability.
SIGNIFICANCE
Broadly speaking, this case contin-
ues the debate about punitive dam-
ages. A number of the amicus briefs
dispute whether there is a problem.
Some amici for State Farm argue
that punitive damages are out of
control and that juries are inconsis-
tent and unpredictable when it
comes to such awards. On the other
hand, amici for the Campbells argue
that punitive damages awards are
relatively infrequent and that juries
behave rationally when they do
impose such damages.
A number of Supreme Court jus-
tices have been concerned about
punitive damages awards, stating
that such awards are "skyrocket-
ing." Justice O'Connor dissented in
both Haslip and TXO when the
majority found that the punitive
damages awards did not violate due
process. Other justices, such as
Issue No. 3
Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas,
and Ginsburg, who all dissented in
the BMW case, believe that the
Supreme Court should not intrude
into an area traditionally within the
province of the states, especially
when a number of states have insti-
tuted reforms to limit punitive dam-
ages awards.
More specifically, however, this case
presents the Court with an opportu-
nity to clarify the difference
between considering out-of-state
wrongdoing when evaluating the
reprehensibility of a defendant's
conduct, which is proper, and pun-
ishing a defendant for out-of-state
misconduct, which is not proper.
Despite approving consideration of a
defendant's out-of-state conduct, the
Court has never detailed the precise
parameters of such evidence.
In BMW, the Court expressed disap-
proval of the practice of multiplying
compensatory damages by the num-
ber of similar sales out of state. The
primary concern seemed to be that
by allowing use of such a multiplier,
one state might impose its standards
on other states. Relevant to the
facts in BMW, different states have
different standards for requiring dis-
closure of presale repairs, reflecting
different policy judgments. To allow
Alabama to punish BMW for sales
that might be legal in other states
would go beyond Alabama's legiti-
mate interests in punishing BMW
and deterring future violations of
Alabama law. The defendants in
both TXO and Haslip engaged in
fraudulent conduct that probably
did not involve the same degree of
disparity of treatment among states.
In the present case, the Court will
have to decide whether there is a
disparity of legislative judgment as
to the conduct engaged in by State
Farm that is akin to the disparity
that existed regarding BMW's con-
duct in the BMW case. The Court
will also have to decide just how
broadly a court may look, in terms
of time, geography, and type of con-
duct, when evaluating the reprehen-
sibility of the defendant's conduct.
In addition, this case may require
the Court to set out a more specific
method for calculating the ratio of
punitive to compensatory damages.
Specifically, to what figure will the
Court compare the punitive dam-
ages? Some ratios are based on the
compensatory damages actually
awarded, such as the $1 million
awarded to the Campbells.
Sometimes, ratios are based on the
plaintiff's out-of-pocket expenses,
which is how the Utah Supreme
Court characterized the ratio in
Haslip. A ratio has also been calcu-
lated based on the potential harm
that could have resulted from the
defendant's misconduct, which is
how the Court came up with the
ratio of 10 to 1 in TXO. The
Campbells argue that the ratio in
their case is really 70 to 1, once the
$1 million in compensatory dam-
ages is added to the excess verdict
against Mr. Campbell, the attorneys'
fees and expenses, and the special
damages. Given the ease with which
the ratio can be manipulated, the
Court should determine which fig-
ures will be used to calculate this
number.
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